Supreme Court Holds Title VII Permits Third Parties to Bring Retaliation Claims

In a decision that may subject employers to more retaliation lawsuits, the Supreme Court in Thompson v. North American Stainless (pdf) has held that under certain circumstances, a third party has standing to bring a retaliation suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. In this case, the plaintiff and his fiancée worked at the same company. The fiancée filed a charge of sex discrimination against the employer with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Shortly thereafter, the company terminated the plaintiff, who subsequently filed suit alleging he had been illegally retaliated against because his fiancée had filed a discrimination complaint. A divided Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately found that Title VII “does not permit a retaliation claim by a plaintiff who did not himself engage in protected activity.” The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that because he fell within the “zone of interests” protected by Title VII, the third-party plaintiff had standing to sue.

Title VII explicitly prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee because he or she has made a charge of discrimination. The statute permits “a person claiming to be aggrieved” to bring a lawsuit against the employer if the action is not administratively resolved. The Court explained that this case presented two questions: whether the plaintiff’s termination constituted unlawful retaliation, and if so, does Title VII provide him with a cause of action?

In response to the first question, the Court said that if the facts as alleged are true, it has “little difficulty” concluding that the plaintiff’s firing was unlawful, as Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision “must be construed to cover a broad range of employer conduct.” Relying on its prior ruling in Burlington N. S .F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), the Court noted that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is broader than its substantive antidiscrimination provision. Specifically, the anti-retaliation provision prohibits an employer’s action that “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Applying this standard to the facts of the case, it was not disputed that reasonable workers might hesitate to file a charge of discrimination if they believed their fiancées could be retaliated against. The Court acknowledged the concern that such a broad standard could subject employers to retaliation suits any time they fire an employee who happens to have a connection to another employee who filed a discrimination charge. The Court claimed that this concern does not “justif[y] a categorical rule that third-party reprisals do not violate Title VII. . . . we adopted a broad standard in Burlington because Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is worded broadly. We think there is no textual basis for making an exception to it for third-party reprisals, and a preference for clear rules cannot justify departing from statutory text.”

As to whether the plaintiff has standing to sue under Title VII, the Court determined that because his termination was an unlawful means of punishing the employee who filed the discrimination charge, his concerns fell within the “zone of interests” sought to be protected by Title VII, and therefore he was a “person aggrieved” entitled to bring suit. The Court explained that this “zone of interests” test denies a right to review “if the plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” The Court held that the term “aggrieved” in Title VII incorporates this test. Applied to the facts of Thompson, the Court reasoned that the plaintiff was not an accidental victim of retaliation, but rather a target to punish the individual – his fiancée – who filed the discrimination charge. Therefore, the Court held, he was “well within the zone of interests” sought to be protected by Title VII.

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, to which all participating justices joined. Justice Kagan had recused herself from this decision.

For more information on this case and its implications for employers, see Littler's ASAP: U.S. Supreme Court Holds that a Third-Party Has Standing to Pursue a Title VII Retaliation Claim by
Ted Schroeder and Marcy McCullough.

Information contained in this publication is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or opinion, nor is it a substitute for the professional judgment of an attorney.