Littler Lightbulb – September Employment Appellate Roundup

Ninth Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment for Fire Department in Claim for Failure to Grant Religious Exemption from Vaccine Mandate

In Petersen v. Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue, 150 F.4th 1211 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 2025), the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for a regional fire department in a lawsuit by firefighters claiming the employer violated Title VII and Washington State law by failing to grant them religious exemptions from a state COVID-19 vaccination mandate. In doing so, the court assumed plaintiffs had set forth a prima facie case, declining to scrutinize plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. Applying the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 453–54 (2023), which “requires employers to accommodate the religious practice of their employees unless doing so would impose an ‘undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business,’” the Ninth Circuit analyzed the fire department’s claim that accommodating the firefighters’ exemption request would impose an undue hardship. 

First, based on unrebutted medical evidence, the court concluded that allowing firefighters to work unvaccinated imposed increased health and safety risks to its own workforce and the public because firefighters could not always mask and social distance. Next, the court noted that almost one quarter of the firefighters had requested an exemption and accommodation. Granting that many exemptions, the court found, would have imposed severe operational burdens on the fire department, potentially impacting the community. Finally, the court considered that the fire department risked both increased absenteeism and related scheduling issues, as well as losing a contract to provide emergency medical services to the Department of Corrections which required proof of vaccination for all on-site contractors. In addition, the fire department argued that it faced potential liability for claims brought against it based on COVID-19 transmission. This concern, the court found, was not merely hypothetical because the department’s insurer had issued a warning about what would not be covered by its communicable disease exclusion. Based on all these factors, the Ninth Circuit held, the fire department could not reasonably accommodate the plaintiffs’ proposed accommodation “without undue hardship on the conduct of” its business.

Ninth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Claim for Religious Exemption to COVID-19 Testing Where Plaintiff Failed to Adequately Plead Religious Basis for the Exemption

The Ninth Circuit addressed a different aspect of an employee’s request for a religious exemption from an employer’s COVID-19 policy in Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Medical Center, __ 4th __ (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2025).  The employer in that case granted the vaccination exemption, but required the employee to wear personal protective equipment and submit to weekly nasal antigen testing using a cotton swab containing ethylene oxide (EtO). The employee refused to undergo the testing, claiming that EtO is carcinogenic and that testing with carcinogens conflicted with her “Christian duty to protect [her] body as the temple of the Holy Spirit.” Ultimately, after the plaintiff continued to refuse testing or reassignment to an alternative position, the employer terminated her employment, and the plaintiff sued alleging religious discrimination in violation of Title VII and Oregon’s parallel state law, ORS 659A.030. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) finding that although the plaintiff’s objection was “couche[d] in religious terms,” it was based on her own secular medical opinion.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that it had not yet endorsed a test for determining whether a belief is religious or secular, but explained that a “sufficient nexus” must exist “between [the plaintiff’s] religion and the specific belief in conflict with the work requirement.” In doing so, however, it cautioned that such a standard does not mean that lower courts should “examine the sincerity or the reasonableness of a belief.” Instead, “[i]invocations of broad, religious tenets cannot, on their own, convert a secular preference into a religious conviction,” and therefore “a complaint must connect the requested exemption with a truly religious principle.” The plaintiff in this case failed to do that, the court determined. Here, the plaintiff’s medical concern about EtO was the sole basis for her objection to the testing, and the alleged harmful nature of EtO had no relationship to her religious beliefs. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit noted, district courts have generally dismissed Title VII exemption requests that are fundamentally predicated on concerns about health consequences where the religious principles are too broad, often invoking the belief, as did the plaintiff in this case, that their bodies are temples of the Holy Spirit.  

Sixth Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment in Another COVID-19 Testing Case Involving Hospital Safety Concerns 

In another COVID-19 testing case, Henry v. Southern Ohio Medical Center, __ 4th __ (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 2025), the plaintiff, a licensed practical nurse, requested an exemption from a hospital’s requirement that employees either get vaccinated against COVID-19 or undergo nasopharyngeal testing weekly. The hospital approved the nurse’s vaccine exemption request, but not the requested exemption from weekly testing, which the hospital interpreted as a request for an exemption from all testing, and placed her on unpaid leave. The plaintiff sued under Title VII for failure to accommodate her religious beliefs and for retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for the hospital and the plaintiff appealed.

Emphasizing the need for the hospital to ensure the safety of its patients and that an accommodation that significantly increases the health and safety risks of vulnerable patients constitutes an undue hardship, the Sixth Circuit concluded that vulnerable patients’ lives could be at risk if they were to contract the virus. Accordingly, the court held that it would be an undue hardship for the hospital to exempt the employee from nasopharyngeal testing.  As to the alternative request for saliva testing, the Sixth Circuit found this would also impose an undue hardship on the hospital. First, evidence showed that saliva testing was less effective at detecting COVID-19 than other forms of testing available at the time. In addition, the hospital introduced evidence that it did not have the in-house capacity to analyze saliva testing results. Doing so would have required third-party analysis which would have at least doubled the time to learn whether the plaintiff tested positive for COVID-19, thus doubling the time the plaintiff could have unknowingly exposed the hospital’s patients and staff to the virus.

Regarding the retaliation claim, the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to show that the hospital had placed her on unpaid leave in retaliation for requesting a religious accommodation, but rather the hospital did so to prevent the spread of COVID-19 among its staff and patients.

Eighth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Discrimination and Retaliation Claims Based on LMRA Preemption

The central issue in King v. United Parcel Service Inc., __ 4th __ (8th Cir. Sept. 25, 2025) was whether the plaintiff’s state law claims for discrimination and retaliation were preempted by the employer’s collective bargaining agreement, thereby providing federal jurisdiction. The plaintiff, a driver covered by a collective bargaining agreement, was disciplined for repeatedly failing to work his Saturday shift. He filed suit in state court alleging race and age discrimination, and retaliation, in violation of state law. The employer removed the case to federal court, and the federal district court granted the company’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The plaintiff appealed.

In analyzing the preemption issue, the Eighth Circuit applied Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), which preempts state law “claims founded directly on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements” or “claims substantially dependent on analysis of” them. In this case, the plaintiff’s race and age discrimination claims were substantially dependent on analysis of the collective bargaining agreement, which provided that drivers in the plaintiff’s category were required to work “five (5) consecutive day schedule[s] of Tuesday through Saturday or Wednesday through Sunday.” Thus, the court concluded, in requiring the plaintiff to work on Saturdays, the company was following its contractual obligations, not discriminating against him based on race or age. The Eighth Circuit also found that the plaintiff failed to adequately plead his retaliation claim because the complaint did not plausibly connect his administrative charge filing to an adverse employment action.

Sixth Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment for Employer in ADA and Age Discrimination and Retaliation Suit

Pemberton v. Bell's Brewery Inc., 150 F.4th 751 (6th Cir. Sept. 4, 2025), involved discrimination and retaliation claims based on age and disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII, and state law equivalents. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the employer.  Among other things, the plaintiff complained that the employer suspended and offered him a severance package in retaliation for complaining about his supervisor’s disparaging remarks following the plaintiff’s workplace back injury, stating that the team considered him to be a “cancer” and that many coworkers thought he was “milking” his injury. Because two years lapsed between the plaintiff’s complaint about his supervisor’s comments and his suspension, no temporal proximity existed, and therefore the plaintiff failed to establish a causal link between the two. Moreover, the court found, the employer had investigated the supervisor’s comments and terminated his employment. 

As to the plaintiff’s discrimination claims, the Sixth Circuit held that even if the plaintiff could establish his prima facie case, he could not overcome the employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for his termination: that he had engaged in inappropriate behavior toward a co-worker based on the co-worker’s mental health. This included, for example, the plaintiff asking disturbing questions to a co-worker who had served in the Marine Corps and struggled with suicidal ideation, such as how many people he had killed during his service and how much money his family would receive if he ended his life. 

Fifth Circuit Applies the Church Autonomy Doctrine to Grant Summary Judgment for a National Religious Organization in Employment Law Claims by the Executive Director

Following his termination as executive director of a national religious organization, the plaintiff in McRaney v. North American Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention, Inc., __ 4th __ (5th Cir. Sept. 9, 2025), who was an ordained minister whose leadership role was to implement the organization’s evangelical objectives, filed suit alleging tortious interference with business relationships, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment in the organization’s favor based on the First Amendment’s church autonomy doctrine and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the church autonomy doctrine in depth. The doctrine “shields religious institutions from interference by state and federal courts,” and includes the ministerial exception, which the Supreme Court has held requires courts “to stay out of employment disputes involving those holding certain important positions with churches and other religious institutions.”  In this regard, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the ministerial exception applies not only to hierarchical churches, but also to religious organizations. In addition to barring the application of employment discrimination statutes such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Title VII, the court stated, “[c]ourts have rejected a wide variety of torts that attack ministry staffing decisions, including wrongful termination, breach of contract, tortious interference, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, conspiracy to commit defamation, negligent supervision and detention, and retaliation—to name a few.”  Affirming summary judgment for the organization the court concluded: “This unconstitutional violation of church autonomy ends today.” In doing so, the Sixth Circuit clarified that the protections afforded by the church autonomy doctrine are more protective than a jurisdictional bar, and instead provide total constitutional immunity from suit.  

Eleventh Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment for the Employer in Sex Discrimination and Retaliation Suit

The plaintiff in Vincent v. Jefferson County Board of Education, __ 4th __ (11th Cir. Sept. 24, 2025), was employed by a staffing firm that provides athletic trainers to local schools.¹ She claimed the employer removed her as athletic trainer for a high school football team because of sex discrimination and that her reassignment by the staffing firm was in retaliation for complaints of sex discrimination. Although it was the school principal who requested the plaintiff’s removal from her position, the plaintiff claimed that even if her employer did not itself harbor discriminatory animus, it could nevertheless be liable under Title VII because it “acquiesced” in the discriminatory request for removal. The district court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments and granted summary judgment for the employer. The plaintiff appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.

A unanimous three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that no evidence existed that the employer knew or should have known the school requested plaintiff’s removal because of her sex.  On the contrary, the school principal asked the employer to remove the plaintiff because she “created somewhat of a toxic work environment for some of [its] coaches,” made “personal comments” about them, and “attempted to assert her ‘authority’ by giving guidance and directions to coaches that have absolutely nothing to do with her role as an athletic trainer.” Rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the employer should have conducted a more rigorous investigation into the school’s reason for requesting her reassignment, the court stated: “Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating; it does not impose a freestanding obligation on staffing firms to formally investigate the motivations of their clients.” 

In her retaliation complaint, the plaintiff alleged her employer retaliated against her for complaining that a co-worker allowed male athletes to “engage in simulating sex acts.” The plaintiff failed to establish that she had engaged in protected activity by opposing an employment practice that was unlawful under Title VII, the Eleventh Circuit held, as there was no evidence that the co-worker engaged in harassing or discriminating conduct against her or other students. Letting students talk inappropriately about sex was, by itself, not a violation of Title VII, the court stated. The plaintiff’s allegation that she was retaliated against for complaining to her supervisor about sex discrimination she allegedly experienced also failed because she could not demonstrate her complaint was a motivating factor in the staffing agency’s reassignment options. Rather, the evidence established that the plaintiff was removed from her position solely because of the school principal’s request and that she would have been removed from her position and offered reassignment even if she had not complained of sex discrimination. Moreover, the plaintiff failed to show that her employer offered her reassignment to lesser paying positions that required a commute because of a retaliatory motivation or her sex, because the other jobs the plaintiff desired had already been filled. 

Based on all these factors the Eleventh Circuit upheld summary judgment for the employer.

Eleventh Circuit Reverses District Court Finding Exclusion of Coverage for Gender-Affirming Care Was Not Sex Discrimination

In another sex discrimination case, the plaintiff in Lange v. Houston County, Georgia, __ 4th __ (11th Cir. Sept. 9, 2025), a transgender woman, sought gender-affirming surgery and requested that the employer-provided health insurance pay for it. The employer denied the request because its insurance policy excluded “[d]rugs for sex change surgery” and “[s]ervices and supplies for a sex change and/or the reversal of a sex change.” The plaintiff sued for disparate treatment based on sex in violation of Title VII. Finding the plan to be facially discriminatory, the district court granted summary judgment in the plaintiff’s favor and issued a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the exclusion.

In an en banc proceeding to answer whether the insurance policy violated Title VII, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and vacated the permanent injunction. Although the plan does not cover gender-affirming surgeries, the exclusion does not turn on whether the employee is a man or woman but applies equally to both, the court stated. Because the policy does not treat anyone differently based on a protected characteristic, the Eleventh Circuit held, it is not discriminatory under Title VII. This decision conflicts with other recent federal court opinions that have construed the exclusion of gender affirming care as unlawful.