ASAP
Court Declares “Interested Party” Provisions of the Illinois Day and Temporary Labor Services Act Unconstitutional
An Illinois state court judge has declared the “interested party” provisions of Illinois Day and Temporary Labor Services Act (“the Act”) unconstitutional, striking a blow to labor unions that advocated their passage just a few years ago. The Act imposes a range of pay and benefit requirements for covered temporary workers.
In 2023, Illinois significantly amended the Act by, among other things, granting interested parties the right to initiate a civil action against a day or temporary labor service agency or third-party client for alleged non-compliance with the Act. This right is set forth in Section 67 of the Act. Those amendments defined “Interested party” as “an organization that monitors or is attentive to compliance with public or worker safety laws, wage and hour requirements, or other statutory requirements.” Since it was enacted, organizations such as unions and worker rights groups have increasingly relied on Section 67 to file civil actions for alleged non-compliance with the Act. On March 6, 2026, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, in Figueroa v. Visual Pak Holdings, LLC,1 held that Section 67 of the Act is unconstitutional because it usurps the Illinois attorney general’s authority to represent the state.
“Interested Party” under Section 67 of the Act
Pursuant to Section 67, the interested party must file a complaint with the Illinois Department of Labor (“the Department”), and the Department will send notice of the complaint to the named parties alleged to have violated the Act and to the interested party. If certain requirements are satisfied, the Department will issue a notice of right to sue, and the interested party may initiate a civil action in the county where the alleged offense(s) occurred or where any party to the action resides. Section 67 permits an interested party to initiate a civil action even when the Department has determined that the complained-of violation was cured or that no violation occurred. The interested party may seek statutory penalties and injunctive relief. Pursuant to Section 67, the interested party who prevails in a civil action “shall receive 10% of any statutory penalties assessed, plus any attorneys’ fees and expenses in bringing the action.”2
The Figueroa Decision
In Figueroa, three plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of a class, and an interested party, Chicago Workers’ Collaborative (CWC), filed a complaint against a staffing company and third-party client alleging various violations of the Act. CWC is a union-sponsored, not-for-profit group that monitors employers’ compliance with worker safety and wage and hour requirements of Illinois and federal law. The individual plaintiffs were contracted by the defendant staffing company as “day and temporary laborers” and were assigned to work at companies the plaintiffs allege are owned by the co-defendant company.
Defendants contended that Section 67 of the Act is unconstitutional because the state of Illinois is the real party in interest and Section 67 usurps the attorney general’s power to represent the state. Ultimately, the court agreed with this argument. As an initial matter, the court found that the Act is clearly a qui tam statute. “Qui tam suits by definition involve suits brough by private parties to assist the executive branch in its enforcement of the law, the violation of which affects the interest of the government, not the individual relator, whose only motivation in bringing the suit is to recover a piece of the action given by statute.” citing United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 1208, 1212 (7th Cir. 1995). The court found that Section 67 is a qui tam statute because it is the state, and not the interested party, that is the entity with “an actual and substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation.”
The court then found the Act was an improper qui tam statute for two reasons. First, the court reasoned that the failure to require an interested party to notify the attorney general of the filing of a civil action renders Section 67 an unconstitutional usurpation of the attorney general’s authority. The attorney general cannot exercise authority to represent the state without notice of the filing of a civil action. The court also found that Section 67 is unconstitutional because it does not grant the attorney general any control over the interested party’s suit. It does not permit the attorney general to dismiss or settle an action brought by an interested party. The court reasoned that Section 67 does not contain any limitation on an interested party’s prosecution of the action.
Impact of Figueroa
The Figueroa decision could redefine the Act’s enforcement mechanisms, including which parties and organizations are able to initiate a civil action. It is important for Illinois employers to monitor the Figueroa decision for any pending appeal and ongoing judicial interpretation. While Figueroa declared Section 67 of the Act unconstitutional, other sections of the Act are unaffected and remain good law.
Staffing agencies with business in Illinois and any employers partnering with those agencies would be well advised to consult with legal counsel regarding compliance with Act.